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Abstract
UN Security Council sanctions have been ineffective in curbing North Korea’s nuclear
weapons proliferation because North Korea’s economy is not open to trade with the rest of the
world. Instead, multilateral sanctions provoke threatening nationalist responses from Pyongyang
rather than the desired compliance. An alternative approach is needed. Using content analysis of
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Debate statements (2006-2016) of the member
nations of the Six-Party Talks and archival research of UN Security Council resolutions, this
case study examines each country’s priorities and policies in addressing North Korea’s nuclear
proliferation. I find that Japan and the Republic of Korea expressed the greatest concern due to
their geographical proximity to North Korea and tense relations. I also found that in each year
China mentioned North Korea, its delegation advocated for the use of Six-Party Talks (6PT) to
achieve denuclearization while the United States never mentioned the 6PT at
all. Additionally, the North Korean delegation mentioned peace in its speeches more than any
other topic coded for in this research which I argue can be used as a basis to resume diplomatic
efforts. Because UN sanctions have been not only ineffective but counter-productive, I
recommend establishing a peace treaty between the parties to the Korean conflict and offering
economic aid and security assurances to the regime in Pyongyang. This policy of peace and
engagement can open the doors for denuclearization talks to resume.
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Executive Summary
In 2006, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North
Korea, tested its first nuclear weapon and has continued to develop them ever since. Its
continued nuclear weapons program has fostered fear among neighbors in the East Asian region
in addition to the international community. Despite widespread opposition and international
protest, the DPRK continues to test weapons because the government believes it a sovereign
right and a necessary means for the nation’s continued existence. Both negotiations with and
sanctions against North Korea have failed to produce the desired outcome of a denuclearized
North Korea. As administrations and governing styles of the pertinent nations continue to
change, little progress has been made in attempts to resolve this conflict.
Although sanctions have been ineffective in denuclearizing North Korea, the tool is
pursued time and time again. North Korea still possesses its nuclear weapons program today and
continues to advance its capabilities, effectively evading sanctions. Therefore, I question why the
same failed strategy is chosen despite its proven ineffectiveness.
To measure sanction effectiveness, I analyzed United Nations General Debate Statements
given in General Assembly meetings at the start of each annual session from 2006-2016. I began
collecting data starting from 2006 when the North Korean government tested its first nuclear
weapon. I focus on the six countries most involved in this issue: the United States, Republic of
Korea (ROK), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China (PRC),
Japan, and the Russian Federation.
UNGA debate speeches are significant because each delegate has limited time (20
minutes) to express its nation’s most pressing concerns to the international community.
Therefore, I reviewed each transcript of the six parties over a span of ten years to track the
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frequency of mentions of North Korea, along with other key terms such as “nuclear weapons,”
“peace,” and “nonproliferation” as an indicator of the nations’ priorities. All the terms and
phrases I coded are listed in my methodology section. I then analyzed the data by including
historical context and potential explanations for my findings. In addition, I introduce sanction
effectiveness in Iran as a counter example of a situation in which the tool appears to have
worked. However, I argue sanctions do not work on denuclearizing North Korea for the
following reasons: 1. The North Korean economy is dependent on a few key trade partners, not
on open trade with the rest of the world; and 2. The North Korean government has successfully
developed its nuclear arsenal further despite multilateral sanctions imposed on the country by the
UN Security Council.
Tensions in the region are escalating, as North Korea gets closer to acquiring weapons
capable of reaching the United States. South Korea and Japan are in closest proximity to North
Korea; therefore, they face the greatest threat. Japan began executing civilian evacuation drills
because of missile tests launched towards the Sea of Japan on March 6, 2017 (Kong, 2017).
Japan has also been considering developing its own nuclear capabilities. Meanwhile South Korea
and the US began official discussions regarding the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile
system, called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) on March 4th, 2016. Using the
potential deployment of THAAD as leverage, Washington tried to pressure Beijing to enforce
sanctions more effectively to contain North Korea. Yet, on July 8, 2016, the United States and
South Korea announced a joint decision to deploy THAAD. China, viewing the system’s radar
interception capabilities as a threat to its national security, protested this decision and has used
economic retaliations against South Korea. For example, On March 4, 2017, China suspended

4

the operations of 87 of the 99 Lotte stores (a major South Korean conglomerate) located in China
(Mullen, Hancocks, 2017).
The situation has been escalating amongst major powers in the region with conflicting
interests. Before the circumstances worsen to the point of armed conflict, a different strategy
must be pursued when approaching the North Korean proliferation issue. I argue for the
normalization of relations between North Korea and the international community, starting with
the United States. I suggest first establishing a peace treaty, then offering North Korea economic
aid and security assurances to ensure the regime in Pyongyang that its national security will be
guaranteed. Only then can denuclearization talks resume.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Article 24 of Chapter I of the UN Charter states that the primary purpose of the UN
Security Council (UNSC) is to “protect international peace and security” and therefore it “has the
authority to act on behalf of all members” of the organization (Mingst, Karns, Lyons, 2016, 34).
North Korea is sanctioned on this basis. As a disclaimer, in no way is this project a defense on
behalf of North Korea. However, the legality of the UNSC’s sanctions on North Korea are
questionable and is unique to the North Korean case. This is because North Korea is neither
party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) nor the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Therefore, it is not bound by international law to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons.
This legal aspect of sanctioning North Korea is analyzed later in this paper.
Under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter, sanctions are intended to apply
pressure on a state to behave in accordance to the Security Council (“Chapter VII | United
Nations”). The UNSC can use sanctions as a tool to compel compliance, as opposed to the use of
force. Sanctions are imposed when there is a threat to the international community, and peace is
at risk, yet diplomacy has failed ("Search | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs").
This project measures sanction effectiveness as behavioral change enacted as desired by
the UNSC. In the case of North Korea, it would mean the dismantling and/or freezing of the
development of nuclear weapons. Iran is used only as a contrasting example and will not be the
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focus of this paper. In the case of Iran, it would mean the halt to the development of nuclear
weapons. In this paper the rationality of UNSC sanctions being used as a tool for compelling
sovereign states to act according to the behavior desired by UNSC member states will be
examined.
I argue sanctions are not the right tool to denuclearize or to resolve the threat(s) posed by
North Korea. Each case of sanction-effectiveness differs by country—sanctions are not a
solution for all. For instance, UN sanctions on Iran were comparatively more effective than those
on North Korea because Iran participated in the open market economy to sell oil, while North
Korea has relied mostly on China for goods and services. Another example of a successful
sanctions regime was Libya. Libya agreed to freeze the development of its nuclear weapons and
normalized relations with the United States. The ultimate result was domestic instability within
Libya and the death of the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi (McMahon, 2006). However, the
Libya case may also be a reason North Korea may not desire to denuclearize.
North Korea is the only state to conduct a nuclear test in the 21st century. The United
States continues to station tens of thousands of troops in and around the Korean peninsula, while
also trying diplomacy to pressure China to control North Korea. In response to increased military
drills and pursuit of stricter sanctions, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests in 2016 alone,
which is the most in a single year. This suggests the regime is hastening its program. As a result,
tensions have been escalating in the Northeast Asian region. Japan is considering changing its
pacifist constitution in order to address the North Korean threat. South Korea continues to
challenge North Korea through military (ROK-US joint military exercises) and economic
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measures (the closing of Kaesong Industrial Complex 1) since it is vulnerable to attack due to
proximity and the fact that the Koreas are technically still at war. From the viewpoint of the
United States and many in the international community, North Korea continues to disrupt peace
and security in the Asia Pacific region. The region remains a powder keg with the potential to
explode.
The failure of diplomacy via the Six-Party Talks to constain North Korea has spurred the
United States and South Korea to take action. Despite China’s strong opposition to the
deployment of THAAD, the US anti-ballistic missile defense system in South Korea, the United
States and South Korea made the joint decision to do so on July 8, 2016. The purpose of
THAAD is to intercept and detonate any potential missiles shot from North Korea inside or
outside the atmosphere during the final phase of flight (US Department of Defense). This
decision faced strong opposition from residents of Seongju County—the location where THAAD
will be deployed. China and Russia have also consistently opposed this, fearing that the system
can be used to intercept their intelligence capabilities. According to Lee (2016) South Korea’s
agreement to deploy the system was a surprise to the international community because China and
South Korea have been working towards developing stronger relations even though they were on
opposing teams during the Korean War. China is now South Korea’s top trading partner as of
2015 (Michigan State University, 2015).

1

The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is a manufacturing facility that was created between
South and North Korea as an economic initiative to demonstrate peaceful cooperation and
symbolize potential reconciliation between the two nations (Manyin, Nanto, 2011, 1). It is
located in North Korea, just across from the demilitarized zone from South Korea. Over 120
medium-sized South Korean companies employed over 47,000 North Korean workers in KIC to
produce goods such as textiles, kitchen utensils, auto parts, et cetera (Manyin, Nanto, 2011, 1).
9

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is an urgent matter because little is known about
North Korea’s leadership and its strategic plans for the use of its nuclear weapons. In the worstcase scenario, this fundamental misunderstanding could lead to the destruction of international
peace and security through a nuclear war. At the very least, North Korea challenges the
economic and political stability of the region. Therefore, policymakers of the United States,
China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the United Nations must attempt to understand
Kim Jong Un’s motivation. Only then will they be able to counter North Korea’s strategy and
formulate the best method to deter North Korea from further developing nuclear weapons.
Many hope for the denuclearization of North Korea, yet the North Korean government
believes its arsenal of nuclear weapons is vital to its government’s defense (Ri Yong-ho, 2016).
Therefore, there is little room for compromise. North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests are
perceived by the American public and international community as threatening and controlled by
a “belligerent” leader (Schaul, 2016; Sherwell, 2013). For instance, Americans may view him as
belligerent and threatening due to his reaction to Sony’s release of The Interview 2, shooting
ballistic missiles in retaliation. However, as unpredictable as Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may
seem, North Korean experts consider him a rational actor in his own best interest.
A North Korean government official stated recently in North Korea’s central newspaper
that the freezing or dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is nonnegotiable,
unless the United States ends its hostile policies. Some of these policies include the joint USROK decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea, the continued joint ROK-US military
exercises along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and targeted US sanctions against North Korea.

2

A 2014 American satire spy-comedy film that depicted two, American comedians’
recruitment into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to act as undercover journalists to
assassinate Kim Jong Un (The Interview, 2014)
10

Therefore, I argue a different tactic other than sanctions should be pursued if the UNSC desires a
different behavior. History shows North Korea launches a nuclear missile or continues
provocations (or shows of military strength) when the UNSC imposes fresh sanctions. No wars
broke out, which could be accredited to the enforcement of sanctions, but the UNSC sanctions
which cause provocative actions do not contribute to peace in the region. In fact, the more North
Korea advances in its nuclear capabilities, the more Japan feels threatened and may feel the need
to develop nuclear weapons as well, an action the US government opposes.
The thesis of this research is that UN sanctions have proven ineffective because UN
resolutions depend on the political will of member states to implement the promised actions. I
argue that continuing to pursue a failed tactic is irrational.
The main concepts of this research are sanction-effectiveness (in the case of North
Korea), sovereignty, peace, and security. History has shown the repeated use of sanctions have
not curbed North Korea’s behavior, yet the strategy is continued. Regarding engagement with
North Korea, John Delury, an expert on North Korean affairs stated in 2008 that 20 years of
history has shown “belligerent quarantine and ambivalent engagement have failed to achieve
positive outcomes for the United States, East Asia, and the North Korean people” (Delury,
2008). Yet the Security Council continues sanctions in an effort to alter North Korea’s behavior.
The methodology used for this research is content analysis of UNGA General Debate
statements to identify the six-party states’ policy prioritizations regarding the North Korean
nuclear crisis in East Asia on the UNSC. Archival research and a case study on North Korea
show sanctions are not effective against all countries, sanctions could provoke states to develop
stronger nuclear weapons (the reverse of the desired result), and sanctions could prohibit
progress from being made between the sanctioned country and the countries imposing the policy.
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Iran is briefly mentioned as a comparative point of analysis as a relatively successful case of
UNSC sanction implementation. Libya serves as a negative reinforcement of normalizing
relations with the US in pursuit of denuclearization. Meanwhile, North Korea is a unique
situation because it is the only state in the 21st century to test nuclear weapons, and is sanctioned
on the premise of threatening international security and peace when North Korea is not bound to
abide by the laws of the NPT or the Test Ban Treaty. Therefore, comparison with other UNSC
sanctions is not possible. Finally, the paper calls for the use of a different strategy in the place of
sanctions.
Some of the research questions explored in this paper are as follows: Why are the UNSC
sanctions imposed on North Korea ineffective? Do China, Japan, South Korea, the United States,
and Russia respect or participate in enforcing sanctions against nuclear North Korea? Since
sanctions have proven ineffective over time, rather than pursuing a failed strategy, what other
tools does the UNSC have to compel states such as North Korea to make peace in the region?
The theoretical perspective adopted in this paper is liberalism. As scholars Mingst, Karns,
and Lyons state, “liberal theorists characterize the international system as an interdependent one
in which there is both cooperation and conflict and where actors’ mutual interests tend to
increase over time. State power matters but it is exercised within a framework of international
rules and institutions that help to make cooperation possible” (2016, 10). This paper
demonstrates liberalism because it suggests policy solutions to denuclearize North Korea by the
United States spearheading the negotiations to offer economic incentive and security assurance
through the framework of the United Nations.
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Chapter 2
Historical Background

At the end of World War II, on August 10, 1945, Japan surrendered its control of the
Korean peninsula (Barry, 2016). Thus, Korea was a product of the conclusion of World War II
and the Cold War, in which the Japanese empire was defeated. In 1945, the Korean peninsula
was temporarily divided at the 38th parallel. The United States occupied the South, while the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) occupied the North. On September 7, 1945, General
MacArthur announced to the South Korean people that he would temporarily be the Commander
in Chief and the United States would occupy the peninsula until the surrender terms were upheld
by Japan, and the personal and religious rights of the South Korean people could be assured. In
September 1948, the Soviet Union installed a communist government in North Korea supporting
Kim Il Sung as the leader of the North Korean People’s Army. Equipped with Russian arms and
tanks, Kim attempted to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula on June 20, 1950, when the
North Korea People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea (United States Army,
2001).
On June 25, 1950, President Truman ordered General Douglas MacArthur to join the
Korean War in support of the South. On June 27, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
adopted S/RES/83: Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea. Besides the United
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States, 21 countries contributed towards the UN peacekeeping force 3. South Korea was fighting
a losing war, having lost the majority of its territory until they received reinforcement. Led by
MacArthur, UN peacekeeping troops (comprised of personnel from 16 nations, 88% from the
US) landed in Incheon and fought a victorious battle against the North in Pusan. This allowed the
South to regain control of its lost territory and gain more territory past the 38th parallel,
encroaching towards the Chinese border. This is when Chinese troops volunteered to assist the
North, pushing the South and UN troops back below latitude 38° N. China sent a total of two
million soldiers to join the war to fight with the North ("Australia's Involvement in the Korean
War").
The Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by US Army
Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. (representing the United Nations Command), North
Korean General Nam II (representing the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army) ("Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea | UN Peacemaker").
The armistice was established as a temporary means before a peace settlement could be decided;
however, a peace treaty has never been signed to date. Therefore, the two countries are
technically still at war. The treaty suspended the hostilities, required the return of prisoners of
war (POW), required the removal of military forces and equipment from a four-kilometer wide
zone known as the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and established the Military Armistice
Commission (MAC) to discuss violations to this truce (“The Korean War Armistice Agreement”,
1953). In 1991, the United Nations officially recognized both North and South Korea as UN

3

United States, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Colombia,
Ethiopia, South Africa, New Zealand, Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Philippines and Luxembourg
sent fighting units while Norway, Sweden, Denmark, India, Italy contributed military hospitals
and field ambulances ("Australia's Involvement in the Korean War").
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member states, a result of the passage of UN Resolution 702 ("Admission of New Members to
the United Nations").
Since then, the two Koreas have progressed into two completely separate countries.
Politically, South Korea has become a democratic country while North Korea remains a
communist dictatorship. Economically, South Korea was able to develop rapidly from being one
of the poorest countries in the world after war, into an advanced economic power as the 11th
largest economy (“GDP Ranking”, 2017). On the other hand, reliable data on North Korea’s
GDP is not available however, it is known to be a very poor state and is considered a developing
nation. Militarily, South Korea established a bilateral alliance with the US to protect its national
security. North Korea developed a nuclear weapons program and continues to develop them
today despite breaching numerous international laws, including UNSC sanctions and human
rights violations.
In 1985, North Korea acceded to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Article III
of the NPT required the DPRK to complete a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to which North Korea demanded the US’s withdrawal of nuclear
weapons from South Korea along with other preconditions. On September 27, 1991, President
George Bush announced US withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed abroad and Russia
followed suit. On November 8, 1991, South Korean president, Roh Tae Woo announced the
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which declares its pledge not to
“produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons” (Davenport, 2016). Assuming South
Korea upheld all promises pledged in its declaration, all of North Korea’s preconditions were
met at this point. On December 31st of that year, both Koreas signed the South-North Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which assured mutual agreement
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not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to
“possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (Davenport, 2016). On January
30, 1992, after over six years since North Korea signed the NPT, they completed a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA.
On March of 1992, the United States imposed its first sanctions on North Korean entities
for missile proliferation activities in June of that year (Davenport, 2016). On April 9, 1992,
North Korea ratified the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and submitted declarations of its
nuclear material to which on September, IAEA inspectors discovered discrepancies in the report
and requested clarifications. North Korea refused the request on February 9, 1993 and announced
its intention to withdraw from the NPT in the following month; they cited Article X of the NPT,
which allowed “withdrawal for supreme national security considerations” (Davenport, 2016).
Since then, a variety of efforts were continued to be made by the international community to
prevent North Korea’s development and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Faced with North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 1994, North Korea signed the
Agreed Framework with the US, which assured Pyongyang would commit “to freezing its illicit
plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid”. This agreement collapsed in 2002 when the
US confronted North Korea with evidence of its secret uranium program and North Korea
declared its withdrawal from the NPT again on January 2003. As a result, a multilateral
negotiation series of six rounds began between the US, ROK, DPRK, PRC, Japan, and Russia,
also known as the “Six-Party Talks” and continued until 2007. These talks were intended to
dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea desired a bilateral negotiation with the
United States, as the Clinton Administration had used when they established the Agreed
Framework. However, the Bush Administration denied this request, preferring the multilateral
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approach. In addition, North Korea agreed to participate upon reading the US’s proposal.
Ultimately, the Six-Party Talks failed when North Korea declared its nuclear activities.
In 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon and has continued to develop them ever
since. North Korea’s continued nuclear weapons program has fostered fear within its neighbors
in the East Asian region in addition to the international community. Despite widespread
opposition and protest from nations around the world, North Korea continues to test its weapons.
The North Korean government believes it a sovereign right and a necessary means for its
nation’s continued existence. Negotiations with North Korea failed and sanctions have failed to
produce the desired outcome of a denuclearized North Korea. To add to this already difficult
situation, as administrations and governing styles of the pertinent nations continue to change, so
does the progress made in attempts to resolve this conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, China
has supported North Korea economically because the collapse of the North Korean regime could
be a socioeconomic burden, and North Korea plays a strategic role as the buffer between US
military forces and China. Therefore, China has a vested interest in maintaining the survival of
the Kim regime.
Since Kim Jong Un (Kim Il Sung’s grandson, and the son of Kim Jong Il) came to power
in 2011, North Korea’s provocations have escalated. The international community thinks China
holds leverage over Pyongyang and has urged China to pressure North Korea more than ever to
cooperate in multilateral efforts in the form of sanctions to curb North Korea's behavior.
Therefore, this past February, China led the drafting of Resolution 2270, the strictest sanctions
imposed on North Korea thus far.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review

Many scholars have written on the topic of the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on
North Korea. However, most approached this research through the analysis of actions pledged to
be enforced by member nations and the assessment of whether the nations successfully fulfilled
their commitments. Yet, I took a different approach with the goal to assess: 1) the intentions and
priorities of nations through the content analysis of UNGA General Debate statements
incorporating qualitative facts to understand the data findings, 2) the progress of nuclear
weapons North Korea was able to develop despite being sanctioned, 3) the intended purposes of
UNSC Resolution 1718 and 2270 imposed on North Korea, and 4) the analysis of the domestic
politics of the member nations of the Six-Party Talks.
In “Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences”,
Park and Walsh (2016) ask, “Do sanctions intended to reduce or halt [weapons of mass
destruction] WMD procurement work, and if not, why not?” They also ask, “What, if any,
unintended consequences—positive or negative—do sanctions against North Korea generate?”
and, “What can be done to improve the effectiveness of these and other sanctions?” (Park, Walsh
2016). Their thesis was that the North Korean regime was able to evade international sanctions
through the establishment of regime operated, state trading companies (STCs), which were
created to procure both licit and illicit goods. Their method was to conduct interviews over a
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three-year period with North Korean defectors who worked in the STCs. Their primary objective
was to document “North Korea. Inc.’s” practices, partners, and pathways, to identify the methods
North Korea utilized to evade international sanctions (Park, Walsh 2016). I interpreted their
theoretical perspective as realism because their study focuses on state actions and capabilities.
The analysis begins by stating more targeted international sanctions are being implemented today
for the purpose of nonproliferation despite academic research that has proven its ineffectiveness.
The analysis offers the perspective of an STC manager tasked with the evasion of sanctions and
the analysis also describes the benefits and consequences of imposing sanctions on North Korea.
The study found an increase in the hiring of more Chinese middlemen in the late 2000s to
implement the logistics of trade. They also found that North Korean embassies were used as a
tool for procurement of arms (Park, Walsh 2016).
In Gordon Friedrichs’ “Smart Security Council? Analyzing the Effectiveness of Targeted
Sanctions,” the main concepts discussed are sanction-effectiveness, sanction-implementation,
and legitimacy. Friedrichs uses legitimacy as a key variable in the assessment of the actions
countries promised to implement (to enforce sanctions) through the case studies of North Korea
and Iran (Friedrichs, 2013). Friedrichs explicitly states that he used the Wendt holistic,
constructivist theoretical approach. Norms such as collective identity and legitimacy are
discussed through this theoretical lens. Friedrichs classified his information by splitting it into an
input dimension, meaning the internal workings within the UNSC, and output dimension, how
the norms within the UNSC are practically implemented (Friedrichs, 2013). His research
questions were, “How do member states contribute to the ratification (intrinsic legitimacy) and
enforcement (extrinsic legitimacy) of smart sanctions?” and “Has the use of smart sanctions
increased the effectiveness of the UNSC as a sanctioning body?” His findings recognized a

19

disconnect between the ratification and enforcement of sanctions, but the reasoning for each case
study of Iran and North Korea differed because Iran participates in the open market economy and
its economic success heavily depends on the export of oil, while North Korea has a self-reliant
economy and does not trade with nearly as many countries as Iran does (Friedrichs, 2013).
Although I agree with the findings, I think Friedrichs is asking the wrong questions. Even
as states upheld their promised actions, North Korea was still able to advance its nuclear
weapons technology. To this critics could say North Korea could have developed its nuclear
weapons at a faster rate without the sanctions; however, sanctions intended to denuclearize North
Korea did not lead to the goal sought. Therefore, instead of assessing whether the countries
followed up on sanctions commitments, I researched the intentions and prioritization of member
nations of the Six-Party Talks by analyzing UNGA General Debate statements, the intended
purpose of specific UNSC sanctions imposed on North Korea, and the nuclear weapons
technology North Korea was able (or unable) to produce in spite of sanctions to assess
effectiveness.
In “The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North Korea,” Suk Hi
Kim and Mario Martin-Hermosillo (2013) discuss the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on
North Korea as well. The main concepts being explored in this paper are sanction effectiveness
and a nuclear North Korea. According to Kim and Martin- Hermosillo, the theoretical
perspective adopted is realism because both authors state the best method to dismantle North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program is for the United States to offer economic aid and security
assistance which would serve North Korea’s interests. They focused their research by using a
qualitative and expository approach incorporating “area studies, social science, and journalism”
(Kim, Martin-Hermosillo, 2013). They find that sanctions imposed on North Korea are
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ineffective because all countries do not enforce the measures as strictly as the United States does.
I agree with the findings of Kim and Martin-Hermosillo’s research. However, I felt the research
lacked the context of domestic politics within the nations of the Six-Party Talks.
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Chapter 4
Methodology

General Assembly Debate Speeches are given on the world stage in the fall at the
beginning of each session. The heads of state and/or delegates for each UN member nation give a
speech regarding its respective country’s agenda for the year (Mingst, Karns, Lyons, 2016, 31).
Each country has a limited amount of time; therefore, the topics mentioned in these speeches
indicate its priorities through the topics addressed. The frequency of the topic(s) mentioned were
recorded in tables and displayed in Sections C and E of the appendices. The frequency of
mentions was the focus of this research over time.
This research conducts content analyses of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
Debates from 2006-2016 given by the nations involved in the Six-Party Talks – a series of
multilateral negotiations attended by China, South Korea, North Korea, United States, Japan, and
Russia (Liang, 2012). The analysis was conducted by recording the number of times respective
topics were addressed. In the first content analysis, I coded for mentions of North Korea that
indicate the states’ levels of prioritization on the issue of a nuclear North Korea: China, Russia,
United States, South Korea, and Japan. Table A in the appendices section shows the coding that
categorizes how I tallied each key term. The words in bold are the words I coded for. The words
with double quotation marks are the exact words I searched for, while the words without
quotation marks are the general ideas I searched for in each transcript.
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Each data finding is context-sensitive (Berg & Lune, 177). For instance, in the years that
North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, the amount of times North Korea was mentioned in a
UNGA General Debate statement could be highest.
Limitations of my method could be that the decision to include or exclude certain
keywords was based on my personal judgment as I saw fit given my research inquiry. For
instance, when coding for mentions of sanctions in Russia’s General Assembly General Debate
transcripts, I included mentions of sanctions that directly regarded North Korea or Russia’s
general opinion of sanctions (which tended to be negative) because this opinion could be used to
assess how Russia feels about implementing sanctions in the case of North Korea. However, I
excluded when sanctions on Iran or other states were mentioned. Therefore, if this research was
duplicated, there could be discrepancies in the numbers.
In addition, in the case that there were multiple speeches given for the General Debate of
the United Nations General Assembly in a given year by the same country, only the first link was
used for the sake of consistency and fair representation of topics mentioned. The data could be
skewed if multiple transcripts were available for some states in a given year as opposed to others.
Another limitation could be that key terms were used for tallies but in some instances a
tally was counted when other words were used to describe the key term even without explicit
mention of the key terms sought. For an example, when Japan’s representative mentioned the
need to address the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, I included this
as an indication that Japan perceived North Korea as a threat which was explicitly stated in
previous years. Therefore, some mentions of indirect acknowledgements of a key term
throughout my data collection could have been missed.
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Similar to the procedures taken to perform the content analysis of the UNGA General
Debate statements of the five nations, the same strategy was used to perform the content analysis
on North Korean delegates’ statements. Table B in the appendices shows the coding that was
used to identify the mentions in each transcript from 2006-2016. For the content analysis of
North Korea’s UNGA General Debate statements, mentions of the five other nations, mentions
of nuclear weapons and facilities, denuclearization, sanctions and resolutions, Six-Party Talks,
the Korean Peninsula, peace, and the United Nations were recorded.
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Chapter 5
Findings

Aside from 2010, South Korea and Japan consistently mentioned North Korea most
frequently of the five states examined. North Korea has also threatened to attack both countries.
This is understandable because both countries are North Korea’s neighbors and US allies with
US military bases located on their territories. On August 3, 2016, North Korea fired three
Rodong medium-range missiles ("Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe", 2016) that are
capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the east, towards Japan (Blair, 2016). This is the longest
range test the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has ever conducted. Doing this, it
breached Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016)
(Blair, 2016; "Security Council Press Statement, 2016). It is also the closest missile fired in
Japan’s direction, landing within 200 nautical miles of Japan’s coastline or within 1,000
kilometers of Japan’s exclusive economic zone ("Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe",
2016). In response to this provocation, Gary Ross, a spokesman for the Pentagon, claimed this
act would only motivate a stronger resolve by the international community to implement stricter
UNSC sanctions (Blair, 2016).
Between 2006-2016, the United States was the only nation that never raised the use of the
Six-Party Talks. On the contrary, other than 2016, each year in which China addressed North
Korea in the UNGA opening debate speeches, China advocated for the use of the Six-Party Talks
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as the best approach to achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. While Russia did not
explicitly advocate for the use of the Six-Party Talks, they did hint towards the need for
multilateral negotiations. They consistently addressed the ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions
imposed on states for the purpose of isolating the target from the international community.
Russia claimed these types of sanctions are often imposed to advance the strategic, political
agendas of the countries imposing them, such as pushing competitors out of the market. This
provokes the question of whether or not Russia is directing this message towards the United
States, which has imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea beyond the UNSC sanctions.
Russia’s representative also stated unilateral sanctions escalate conflicts rather than
effectively curbing the target countries’ reprimanded behavior ("United Nations General
Assembly Seventieth Session”, 2015). While states such as China, South Korea, and Japan were
mentioning the need for the use of Six-Party Talks in their UNGA opening statements in earlier
years, the only year Russia explicitly mentioned the need for Six-Party Talks was in 2016;
Russia was the only country in this year to mention the need (amongst the five countries
analyzed). Some speculate Russia may have specified the need to resume the Six-Party Talks
because of the strategic decision made by the ROK-US alliance to deploy THAAD ("Security
Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People's Republic of Korea”, 2016).
Between 2006-2010, China did not mention sanctions as a recommended approach
towards denuclearizing North Korea. In addition, aside from 2008-2010, 2012, and 2015, China
consistently advocated the use of Six Party Talks as the best strategy. China also endorses
targeted sanctions, but not the measure requiring mandatory inspection of all cargo into and out
of North Korea. China reaffirmed its posture against the use of force ("Security Council
Condemns”, 2006).
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September 21, 2016 marked a turning point when China mentioned the need to
denuclearize without mention of the negotiations. This aligns with the fact that on February 22,
2016, China led the drafting of UNSC Sanction 2270, which is noted as the strictest set of
sanctions imposed on North Korea thus far ("Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on
Democratic People's Republic of Korea”, 2016; Snyder, 2016). This hardening of position to
implement stricter financial sanctions on North Korea could have been driven by China’s firm
opposition of the THAAD deployment (Keqiang, 2016). Yet, according to a statement given by
Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of the US Pacific Command, in the Pentagon Briefing
Room on February 25, 2016, THAAD is intended for the sole purpose of protecting South
Korean citizens and Americans who are based there. Therefore, it will not be a threat to China’s
national security interests and should not cause China any concern. However, Harris also noted if
China wanted to prevent the THAAD deployment and desired a method to do so, China should
exert its influence on North Korea (Harris, 2016). However, despite opposition from both Russia
and China, on July 8th, 2016, the joint decision to deploy THAAD in Seoul was announced.
Although no public mentions rescinding support of sanction enforcement was announced,
Beijing feels its goodwill to cooperate on the North Korean issues was undermined (Lankov,
2016).
Table C in the Appendices section shows the content analysis of North Korea’s UNGA
General Debate statements. It shows that North Korea consistently advocates for the respect of
its sovereignty, a founding principle of the United Nations emphasized in the Charter. North
Korea claims the United States does not desire peaceful relations, claiming it chooses to sanction
North Korea directly after measures were agreed upon to move towards cooperation. Stephen
Costello, policy analyst with 20 years of experience in Korea and Northeast Asia, notes that
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North Korea believes the immediate denuclearization of the Korean peninsula may not be the
main goal but rather a justification for keeping US armed forces in northeast Asia as a broader
geopolitical strategy of containing states such as China and Russia (Costello 2016). This same
argument was delivered by North Korean delegates at the UNGA General Debate Meetings.
Another important finding was that the North Korean delegate never mentioned either
China or Russia. In addition, the Six Party Talks were mentioned only occasionally by North
Korea in 2006, 2008, and 2010-2011. Kim Jong Un came to power on December 2011, which
overlaps with the fact that the Six-Party Talks were never once mentioned since his leadership.
The talks were intended for denuclearization, but Kim Jong Un made it clear that this was nonnegotiable and that he sees nuclear weapons as necessary for the defense of the nation (KCNA,
2016). Ri Yong-ho, North Korea’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, claimed it was unfair to be
sanctioned for conducting nuclear tests to improve North Korea’s military defense when South
Korea and the United States are allowed to exercise their rights to improve their defense through
joint military drills (Ri Yong-ho, 2016).
In addition, the content analysis shows North Korea mentioned the topic of peace
frequently (if not most frequently) in the UNGA General Debate speeches as seen in the
following years: 2006, 2013, and 2015. In 2006, while Kim Jong Il was the Supreme Leader of
North Korea, Choe Su-hon, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed North Korea
desired to negotiate peace and denuclearization through diplomatic measures (Choe Su-hon,
2006). In 2013, while Kim Jong Un was the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Pak Ui-Chun, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed its security must be guaranteed in the form of a peace treaty
(Pak Ui-Chun, 2013). In 2015, Ri Yong-ho, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs called for a
peace treaty again (Ri Yong-ho, 2015). He stated that the United States should replace the
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Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty with the Korean peninsula. This finding is significant
because the media often depicts North Korea as a disruptor of peace by focusing on its missile
launches and nuclear tests. However, during the UNGA General Debate speeches, the North
Korean delegates have consistently asked for diplomatic means of attaining a peace treaty on the
Korean peninsula to de-escalate tensions. I recognize the statements given in these speeches may
not represent the whole truth; however, I think they can be used as a basis to re-start negotiations
with North Korea.
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Chapter 6
Sanctions

The purpose of UNSC Resolution 1718 was to end the development of nuclear weapons
in North Korea and to change the policies of the North Korean regime in a way in which the
North Korean people would not suffer 4 ("United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718",
2006). The purpose of UNSC Resolution 2270 was to apply pressure to the North Korean
leadership ostensibly to bring them back to the negotiation table on denuclearization, while
reducing the suffering of the North Korean people ("United Nations Security Council Resolution
2270", 2016). These sanctions were more targeted. The states drafting the resolution understood
the outcome of these sanctions would not be denuclearization because Kim Jong Un refuses to
negotiate denuclearization unless US policies that Pyongyang perceives as provocative, such as
the joint US-ROK military exercises, are terminated (KCNA, 2016).
The sanctions imposed in 2006 under Resolution 1718 include restrictions regarding:
arms and related material, nonproliferation, proliferation networks, interdiction and
transportation, provision of bunkering services, assets freeze, travel, financial measures,
specialized teaching and training, coal and minerals, fuel, and luxury goods ("United Nations

4

In the past, economic sanctions were imposed on North Korea without consideration of the
detrimental impacts on the North Korean citizenry; therefore, recent sanctions have been drafted
with consideration to how it could affect the people to minimize damage on innocent North
Koreans while directing the desired effect onto North Korean government leaders.
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Security Council Resolution 1718", 2006). In 2016, under Resolution 2270, the following
sanctions were included and/or expanded upon: arms embargo, financial measures, assets freeze,
specialized teaching and training, coal and minerals ban, and luxury goods ban ("United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2270", 2016). Furthermore, new cargo inspection measures were
added.
In 1994, North Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT. To prevent this,
Washington and Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework (Davenport, 2016). However, the
agreement collapsed in 2002 (because Washington became aware of North Korea’s uranium
plant), so North Korea re-announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Therefore, in
August of 2003, the Six Party Talks were initiated. Then, on 2005 North Korea pledged to take
steps towards denuclearization and return to the NPT after (according to Korea Central News
Agency, North Korean state media) the U.S. clarified its stance and declared that it recognizes
North Korea as a sovereign state and will pursue bilateral talks rather than the framework of SixParty Talks (Davenport, 2016). In 2007, measures to enforce the agreements made in 2005 were
decided. However, in 2009, the agreements were dismantled over disagreements on verification
measures (of nuclear activity, inspection standards and criterion) and North Korea’s
internationally condemned rocket launch. Since then, North Korea refused to return to
negotiations and to recommit to the pledges made in 2005 (Davenport, 2016).
Sanction effectiveness is defined as the denuclearization of nuclear weapons in the case
of North Korea (Resolution 1718). Therefore, according to this definition, Resolution 1718
failed. North Korea was able to evade sanctions successfully, to continue to use international
financial services, and trade with long-trusted partners (foreign nationals) abroad for the goods
needed (“UN Report of the Panel of Experts”, 2016).
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On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its 5th nuclear test, the third under Kim
Jong Un’s leadership. This fifth test is significant because it proved that North Korea can arm a
missile with a nuclear warhead. North Korea has been testing diverse types of weapons including
rockets, short-range, medium-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, launches from fixed
sites, road-mobile launchers, and submarines (Jackson, 2016). According to the US Geologic
Survey, this 5th test had a seismic magnitude of 5.3, which is the strongest test conducted to date
("M 5.3 Nuclear", 2016).
Figure D in the Appendices section shows a table produced by the Center for Strategic
International Studies portrays the progress in nuclear weapons development within a decade.
Various intervening variables beyond North Korea’s recalcitrance may have contributed
to the failure of UNSC sanctions. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis which hurt both the
United States and Russian economies could have affected the ability to enforce the sanctions
against North Korea. Other reasons for failure include China’s strategic interests to maintain the
survival of North Korea since it serves as a strategic buffer separating China from the US
military forces. Furthermore, a collapse of the North Korean government could lead to economic
and social instability with a mass migration of North Koreans flooding into China. In order to
avoid this, China sustains North Korea.
Iran:
Figure 1 below shows the types of sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea were
similar. Yet, the sanctions imposed on Iran were considered to be effective because the state
participated in the open market to export and depended on the international financial system to
sell its oil (Luce, 2016). Meanwhile, North Korea trades with other countries through illicit
channels with an estimated 70% of exports happening inside China’s economy (Luce, 2016).
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Therefore, Iran’s economy was hard hit by the economic sanctions. This ultimately drove Iran
back to the negotiating table.
Figure 1:

Comparative Types of UNSC Sanctions Imposed (2006Present)
Type of Sanction
Iran
North Korea
Denial of Visas (travel ban)
x
x
Arms Embargo
x
x
Export or Import Limits
x
x (luxury goods, 2016)
Asset Freeze
x
x
Source: Data from Mingst, Karns, Lyon’s The United Nations in the 21st Century
Sanctions imposed on Iran resulted in domestic disapproval from the poor citizens who
opposed their isolation and poverty and elites who opposed the detrimental impact on their
businesses (Fisher, 2017). Meanwhile, North Korea has proved it can withstand economic
deprivation and consequences of poverty. For instance in 1990, 10% of North Korea’s
population died of starvation from the nation’s worst famine epidemic, however the state did not
succumb to the internal unrest nor uphold agreements of denuclearization in exchange of
sanctions relief (Fisher, 2017). Therefore, analysts question whether even the strictest of
sanctions enforced by China could effectively persuade North Korea to take steps towards
denuclearization.
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Chapter 7
Analysis of Domestic Politics

United States
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump, the forty-fifth President of the United States, was
inaugurated. In light of North Korea’s recent missile tests towards the East Sea (Sea of Japan),
President Trump claimed the US would ramp up its policies against the country. In addition, on
March 17, 2017, newly appointed Secretary of State Rex Tillerson claimed military action is “not
off the table” in any case in which the North Korean government takes action to threaten South
Korean and US troops (U.S. Department of State, 2017).
Despite such big talk, and seemingly more hardline policy ideas, the United States
appears to be following the diplomatic strategy of previous administrations by pressuring China
to enforce sanctions more effectively. On April 6, 2017, China’s President, Xi Jinping, visited
the United States for his first official meeting with President Trump (Bradner, Jiang, 2017).
Trump claimed he could offer better trade conditions to Xi Jinping in the case that China
continues to pressure North Korea. Trump also commended China’s enforcement of its latest ban
against coal imports from North Korea as a step in the right direction.
Both the US Congress and Administration support stricter nuclear sanctions. With
bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, legislation entitled H.R. 1644: Korean Interdiction and
Modernization of Sanctions Act was unanimously approved by the House Foreign Affairs
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Committee and will be reviewed by other House of Representatives’ committees before going to
the House floor for a vote (H.R. 1644, 2017). This bill would expand upon the US sanctions
regime against North Korea as described in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act (NKSPEA), which was signed into law on February 2016. Thus, the trajectory of US policy
on North Korea appears to favor the continued enforcement of sanctions measures, mirroring the
previous administrations’ policy actions. Having taken steps to sanction North Korea through US
legislation, the United States will most likely continue to enforce UNSC sanctions on North
Korea as well.
South Korea
The future of South Korea’s stance on North Korea is uncertain following the
impeachment of South Korea’s former conservative president, President Park Geun Hye on
December 9, 2016 5. The current acting president of the ROK is Hwang Kyo-ahn, a member of
the Independent Party. He is also the ROK’s Prime Minister, former Minister of Justice, and a
lawyer by trade. However, it seems likely that South Korea will elect a liberal president in the
upcoming election on May 9th after having had two conservative leaders— Park Geun Hye and
Lee Myung Bak. Furthermore, the negative perceptions of the ruling party from the sinking of
the ferry Sewol contributed to the president’s impeachment 6. Public distrust of the ruling party is

5

The former president had a nefarious relationship with Choi Soon-sil who acted as the
president’s aide despite her lack of an official government position (Griffiths, 2017). She
influenced and interfered with South Korean governmental policies. The revelation of this
relationship resulted in domestic uproar and massive protests from South Korea’s citizenry and
culminated in Park Geun Hye’s impeachment through South Korea’s Constitutional Court Order
on March 10, 2017 (Griffiths, 2017).
6
The sinking of the ferry Sewol led to the death of over 300 school children and was ruled to be
a result of human error ranging from “illegal redesign” of the ship, “overloaded cargo bay,
inexperienced crew, and a questionable relationship between the ship operators and state
regulators” (“South Korean Ferry”, 2017). Former President Park’s negligent handling of this
crisis was one of the reasons for her impeachment (“South Korean Ferry”, 2017).
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very high. The two leading candidates are Ahn Cheol-soo and Moon Jae-In. Ahn is a software
entrepreneur, member of the National Assembly, and member of the centrist People’s Party.
Moon is the former Chief of Staff to the late President Roh Moo Hyun and the current leader of
the Minjoo Party (a democratic party) (Rogin, 2017).
Traditionally, conservative leaders in South Korea have been tougher on North Korea and
more cooperative with the US, while liberal leaders have been less harsh against the North
Korean government and have favored offering assistance. The possible and likely election of a
liberal president will be significant and may decrease the strength of the US-ROK alliance. For
instance, while former President Park agreed to the deployment of THAAD, presidential
candidate Moon believes this decision could delay the prospects of negotiations with North
Korea and seeks a different approach.
It is fair to speculate that the election of Ahn or Moon will lead to clashes in interests
with President Trump. Both Ahn and Moon seem to have similar policy ideas regarding
sanctions alone being ineffective in stopping North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons;
however, while both opposed THAAD initially, Ahn has changed his stance and believes it is
“irresponsible” for a future president to reverse a decision already made between two
governments (Choe, 2017). Thus Ahn has gained support from conservatives and South Korean
citizens believe there will be less friction between the United States and South Korea under
Ahn’s leadership.
On April 18, 2017, ROK’s acting president, Hwang and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence
discussed concrete measures “to increase sanctions and pressure on North Korea, expand
cooperation with China, ensure the swift deployment of THAAD, and jointly respond to China’s
retaliatory measures against the ROK” (Republic of Korea, 2017). For instance, in economic
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retaliation, the official Chinese news media urged its consumers to boycott South Korean
products and government officials closed 87 of 99 Lotte stores (a major South Korean
conglomerate) located in China (Mullany, Buckley, 2017; Denyer, 2017). While the current
acting president is in favor of imposing stricter sanctions on North Korea, it seems unlikely that
the leading presidential candidates will support this conservative policy.
China
China continues to deal with North Korea as a reliable economic partner and an
unpredictable neighbor. This seeming contradiction exploded in the media following the death of
Kim Jong Nam, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother. Beijing had granted immunity
to Kim Jong Nam and Kim lived many decades in Chinese cities 7. However, after the poisoning
of Kim in the Malaysian airport by North Korean agents, Beijing reacted strongly by banning
coal imports from Pyongyang until the end of 2017 (which is a significant financial blow to the
regime), among other responses (Sharman, 2017). Tensions have been escalating between these
long allies. This is significant because Beijing accounts for over 70% of North Korea’s trade and
provides food and energy assistance to North Korea to ensure the country remains stable.
However, in light of recent events, even China has increased pressure against North Korea
(Jiang, 2017).
As stated by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang at a press conference in April 19,
2017, Chinese government officials are gravely concerned by North Korea’s recent nuclear and

7

The reason for Kim Jong Nam’s murder remains uncertain; Former CIA Analyst Sue Mi Terry
speculates that although slim, there was a chance Jong Nam had a power base within North
Korea and could have assumed power of the North Korean government, replacing Jong Un at the
behest of China or the United States (Fifield, 2017). In addition, in 2010 on the day before Jong
Un appeared on television for the first time, Jong Nam publicly opposed the “third-generation
succession” of power, referring to his younger brother’s accession into power.
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missile tests, which continue to threaten peace. The Chinese officials firmly oppose all relevant
party’s words or actions that may further escalate the tension in this volatile region (The People’s
Republic of China, 2017). According to William Perry, a former US Secretary of Defense, China
has been supporting the survival of North Korea’s government to prevent a potential mass
migration outflow of North Koreans into Chinese borders, and maintain the existence of North
Korea as a strategic buffer between China and US military forces on the Korean Peninsula.
However, China’s core interests are being challenged as North Korea continues weapons testing
despite US Secretary of Defense Rex Tillerson’s threat of US military intervention and threats of
Japan and ROK developing nuclear weapons (Perry, 2017). Therefore, Chinese government
officials have more incentives now than ever before to enforce sanctions more strictly.
According to an article published in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the
Chinese Communist Party, Chinese government officials remain firm in their encouragement of
a cessation of hostilities and affirmation of needed negotiations between the US and North Korea
(Zhou, 2017). This urge for dialogue between the relevant states aligns with the content analysis
of UNGA opening debate speeches when China consistently advocated for the use of Six-Party
Talks. Due to the Trump Administration’s demonstration of military might in the firing of 59
Tomahawk missiles on Syria on April 6, 2017, Chinese government officials feel threatened by
potential US military action against North Korea. Zhou Bo, the author of the article and honorary
fellow with the Center of China-American Defense Relations at the Academy of Military
Science, warns there is no guarantee that the United States can successfully eradicate every
nuclear facility through military force before North Korea launches its nuclear missiles, rockets,
and artillery shells in retaliation. In this scenario, no defense system, including THAAD, will be
capable of preventing North Korea’s counterstrike. Furthermore, Zhou states continued testing is
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a result of Pyongyang’s perceived threat of pre-emptive attack by the United States to “effect
regime change”. Moreover, Zhou asserts North Korea’s provocations will subside if the USROK military drills (in addition to other threatening words and actions) are halted. It is clear
diplomatic negotiations with North Korea must be pursued now more than ever (Zhou, 2017).
In addition, China is vehemently opposed to the deployment of THAAD because they
fear this may be the first step towards “a broader American network of antimissile systems” in
places such as Japan or the Philippines to counter China’s growing military threat (Mullany,
Buckley, 2017). In the Chinese perspective, THAAD is a strategic move for the United States to
expand its own national security interests rather than assisting the South in securing its interests.
The Chinese government officials believe the United States may be covertly planning to destroy
China’s nuclear weapons capabilities.
Japan
On March 6, 2017, Japan was at its highest alert after North Korea fired four missiles
towards the East Sea (Sea of Japan). Three landed in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone, while
one landed about 350 kilometers west of its Akita prefecture. As a result, Japan began to conduct
civilian evacuation drills and Japan restarted considerations of developing its own nuclear
capabilities, which has been controversially debated between government officials within Japan.
For about 70 years Japan has abided by Article 9 of its constitution that limits the government's
defense expenditures to 1% of its GDP as stipulated in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between Japan and the United States of America. However due to the continued and
growing threat of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the leaders within
Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), are ready to support Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe if he chooses to take actions towards the amendment of the nation’s constitution.
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The Japanese citizens have been against a larger military. Also, because Japan was once a
colonial power and historical angst remains, as a result tensions may rise within the country, the
region, and the world.
Within Japan, there is a divide in political opinion between the liberal and centrist
(leading opposition party, Democratic Party of Japan) and right (Liberal Democratic Party)
camps on approaching the North Korean nuclear issue. The left views Japan as a peace facilitator
and advocates for the use of dialogue and the continued use of its pacifist approach on North
Korea. They are also skeptical of remilitarization and believe the United States should not
provoke North Korea. Meanwhile, the right views North Korea as a grave security threat and
Prime Minister Abe, a member of the LDP, has unsuccessfully proposed legislation in the
National Diet to increase the Japanese government’s defense budget. While the parties disagree
on increasing the defense budget, both the DPJ and LDP advocate for stronger UNSC sanctions
in light of recent North Korean provocations (“Statement Strongly Condemning”, 2016).
Therefore, it appears there is bipartisan support of international sanctions enforcement within
Japan despite the disagreements in measures taken on the national front to appease the growing
nuclear threat.
Russia
Russian policymakers have supported sanctions against North Korea and criticized the
regime for its continued nuclear weapons program. However, since the past three years, Russia
has become North Korea’s “greatest ally,” as claimed in North Korean state media. Russian
delegates visited Pyongyang in January 2017 to discuss the repair of a railway system connecting
the two nations (Ramani, 2017). In addition, as tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang escalate
and deescalate, China’s oil supplies are “periodically disrupted”, thus North Korea’s reliance on
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Russia for fuel increased. These supplies are critical sources of hard currency for Pyongyang as
they process the oil in its chemical plants and resell it to the Chinese consumers (Ramani, 2017).
Therefore, in expression of its gratitude, North Korea has sent 10,000 workers to Siberia, which
is a beneficial, cheap source of labor for Russia.
Despite experts’ assessments that Russia has little influence on the Korean peninsula,
with the projected shift in South Korea’s administration to a liberal leader, relations between
Russia and the South will likely improve. As the only other nation with direct influence over
North Korea (besides China), improved relations with the South and the North could position
Russia as a mediator on the Korean Peninsula and eventually a greater influencer in the region.
According to a statement released by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 11,
2017, Russian government officials are concerned with the Trump Administration proclamation
to use military force (Russian Federation, 2017). Like Chinese government officials, Russian
representatives support the de-escalation of tensions through cooperative means such as dialogue
and oppose any action or words that may provoke relevant states. This aligns with the content
analysis from Russia’s UNGA General Debate speeches which show Russia has indirectly
advocated for negotiations to achieve denuclearization. Russian representatives consistently
opposed unilateral sanctions for isolating a target from the international community, stating it has
proven ineffective in curbing the target country’s reprimanded behavior. Additionally, on April
20, the UNSC (including member states: China, United States, and Russia) unanimously released
a statement condemning North Korea’s ballistic-missile launch on April 15, 2017. The statement
also emphasized the importance of deescalating tensions on the Korean peninsula and urged
member states to accelerate their enforcement of sanctions measures specifically resolutions
2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016) (United Nations, 2017). According to an article published in the
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Guardian, the Russian representative opposed the original statement drafted by US representative
Nikki Haley, while the Chinese representative supported it. The Russian delegation advocated
for the inclusion of language stressing the need for a peaceful solution through dialogue and
approved the latter draft that contained this mention (“UN Security Council Warns”, 2017).
In conclusion, it is clear domestic support for sanctions exist amongst the nations, yet it is
not the entire solution nor the only proposed method towards denuclearization on the Korean
peninsula. Russia and China have pushed for diplomatic engagement with North Korea through
dialogue and with the projected outcome of South Korea’s presidential election, the likely liberal
leader of the nation will also support negotiations. Sanctions have not curbed North Korea’s
proliferation and the North Korean government has proved its ability to evade and withstand the
economic pressure.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion

Imposing UNSC sanctions on North Korea is a better strategy than not sanctioning the
DPRK because sanctions are a collective statement made by the international community.
Despite this, the question of how to denuclearize the DPRK remains. I argue diplomatic talks
between the United States and North Korea must be restarted. For fifteen years, Track I
Diplomacy between the two states has been nonexistent. Track I Diplomacy is the official
diplomatic channel through the government ("What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?"). Track I is
specified, because the two countries do use Track II Diplomacy to allow university students and
staff to visit the country and learn more about each respective nation. Track II diplomacy is the
channel of communication between non-governmental organizations to identify and analyze
international conflicts by non-state actors ("What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?"). This could be
symbolized as the potential relationship the two nations could share through a Track I Diplomacy
relationship if the United States treats the DPRK as an equal and acknowledges that the DPRK’s
self-interest is to maintain and continue to develop its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang feels its
ensured security comes through its possession of these weapons. The prevention of a third world
war and nuclear war is the reason the UN System was developed after World War II in the first
place.
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Are UN Security Council Sanctions the best tool to curb North Korea’s behavior?
Through the systematic collection of data, a look at the patterns of state behaviors and mentions
of topics identified, different historical contexts were incorporated into the analyses to make
sense of the data findings. This assessment indicated key patterns that aligned with the liberalism
theoretical perspective but also different hypotheses of scholars regarding the rationale behind
the continued pursuit of the failed strategy of sanctions. The answer could be that it was intended
to unify South Korea and Japan to serve the US interest of forming an Asian ‘NATO’ in the Asia
Pacific to contain Chinese expansion (Costello, 2016). This may be connected to the US strategy
of pivoting to Asia. Has the United Nations been used as a tool to advance this type of strategic
interest forward?
All in all, according to the data uncovered, and analysis conducted, the UNSC sanctions
failed. Therefore, another policy must be implemented. I urge the delegates of UN member states
to support the normalization of their respective relations with North Korea and as an
international community. The analysis of UNGA General Debate statements given by the North
Korean delegates indicates they have requested diplomacy and negotiations with the United
States one-on-one to settle disputes rather than operating under the Six Party Talks framework.
Therefore, a UN policy acknowledging the DPRK’s terms and conditions could incite successful
negotiations. The recommended course of action is to start negotiation of a peace treaty between
South and North Korea. Then, North Korea should be guaranteed security assurances and offered
economic aid in exchange for denuclearization. As requested by the North Korean delegation,
negotiations should be pursued through bilateral talks with the United States. An effort to deescalate tensions in the region and a harder push to return to a diplomatic solution is
recommended. These policies should be implemented in place of sanctions.

44

Next steps for this research include analyzing additional variables for the assessment of
sanction effectiveness such as the connection between UNSC sanctions imposed on the DPRK
and the date of provocations. Analyzing this could indicate if a cause and effect relationship
exists.
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Appendices
A. Coding for Content Analysis of UN General Debate Statements 2006-2016 for the
following countries: China, South Korea, North Korea, United States, Japan, and
Russia
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B. Coding for Content Analysis of UN General Debate Statements 2006-2016 for the
North Korean delegation
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C. Content Analysis of UN General Debate Statements 2006-2016 for the North Korean
delegation
Comment: To fit the information into one chart, words such as China was shortened to its
acronym PRC, the Republic of Korea (South) was shortened to ROK, the Six-Party Talks was
shortened to 6PT and the United Nations was shortened to the UN.

Source: UNGA General Debates 2006-2016
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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D. CSIS Figure Portraying the Development of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

Source: CSIS Office of the Korea Chair
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E. Content Analysis of UN General Debate Statements 2006-2016
Comment:
Blank cells indicate there was no information found. The administration of each country of each
year the UNGA General Debate address was given was included rather than the speaker who
gave the address. This is because I think the leaders within each respective administration set the
agenda for their respective nations thus their agendas are determined by them.

Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2006
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2007
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2008
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2009
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2010
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2011
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2012
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2013
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive

69

Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2014
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2015
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive

71

Source: UN General Assembly Debates 2016
https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive
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F. Context Tables Used in Analysis Above:
Table 1

Source: Department of US Treasury, North Korea Sanctions
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Table 2

Source: Department of US Treasury, North Korea Sanctions
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Table 3
North Korea Nuclear Tests
10/6/2006
1st
5/25/2009

2nd

2/12/2013

3rd

1/6/2016

4th

9/6/2016

5th

Source: CNN News "North Korea's Nuclear Tests are Getting More Powerful"
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